Search Results for 'philosophy'


Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 83-87 (2011/2012). ME…
ABSTRACT: I argue in opposition to Sam Rakover that the current lack of fully adequate theories of the subjective and qualitative aspects of mind does not justify the adoption of what he calls "methodological dualism" (Rakover, this issue). Scientific und…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 61-81 (2010). REPLY TO C…
Six of the seven commentaries expressed basic agreement with our characterization of dispositioning as a typically unacknowledged, pervasive, and often problematic explanatory practice. One of these (Glenn) situated our own interpretive activity within th…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 179-197 (2010). REPLY TO…
I was surprised and to a considerable extent pleased that Per Holth and Jay Moore, two behavior analysts for whom I have the greatest respect, thought that my six Remarks columns, published back in the late 1970s and early 1980s, were still sufficiently s…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 5-69 (2008). DISPOSITION…
"Now" is privileged in most psychological theories, which portray their processes as proceeding from moment-to-moment. As in any science, this adherence to contiguous causation hinders an account of phenomena that involve remote events or temporally ex…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 71-85 (2008). DRETSKE ON…
In two recent articles and an earlier book Fred Dretske appeals to a distinction between triggering and structuring causes with the aim of establishing that psychological explanations of behavior differ from non-psychological ones. He concludes that int…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 87-96 (2008). THE CONCEP…
The history of psychology has seen recurrent controversies on the circularity of reinforcement explanations, and behavior analysts disagree among themselves as to whether the concept of operant reinforcement is explanatory or descriptive. Some behavior …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 97-111 (2008). THE NATUR…
Philosophers and psychologists have debated what is meant by free will as well as the nature of human choice. However, only recently have data been gathered to consider common usage of the term; our data support college students' belief in free will as i…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 113-155 (2008). INTENTIO…
The central fact in the delineation of radical behaviorism is its conceptual avoidance of propositional content. This eschewal of the intentional stance sets it apart not only from cognitivism but from other neo-behaviorisms. Indeed, the defining charac…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 157-168 (2008). THE ABDI…
What follows is a reply to a reply and, as such, necessarily derives, at least in part, from the comments of Foxall's critics. However, I tried to review Foxall's reply as a "new" paper standing on its own merits and, as such, I wanted to respond to it…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 1-55, (2007). INTENTIONA…
This paper proposes an overarching philosophical framework for the analysis and interpretation of behavior that incorporates both radical behaviorism and intentional psychology in a model, "intentional behaviorism"' that additionally links the explanati…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 57-60, (2007).COMMENTARY…
Foxall's incorrect claims about behavior analysis (2007) arise from a failure to understand the stance of behavior analysis. Behavior analysis is the science of behavior; it is about behavior and not about organisms. It views behavioral events as natura…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 61-64, (2007). ARE FOXAL…
Foxall's argument that behavioristic and intentional approaches should be hybridized rests on his views about the inability of a behavioristic position to deal with several features of behavior, including its continuity through time. My commentary sugg…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 65-76 (2007). ABOUT ABOU…
The rationale, scientific necessity, and character of intentionality ascriptions (assertions that attribute beliefs, expectations, wishes and such to certain systems) remain unresolved issues in the philosophy of mind and psychology. Foxall's proposed r…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 77-92 (2007). GORDON FOX…
"Intentional behaviorism" is Gordon Foxall's name for his proposal to mix the oil of mentalist language with the water of empiricist behaviorism. The trouble is, oil and water don't mix. To remain scientific, the language of behavioral science must rema…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 93-100 (2007). FUZZY LOG…
Foxall introduces mental constructs into his modified behaviorism. His goals are praiseworthy, as a reconciliation of public behavior with private dialog-one that improves on contemporary extensions of behaviorism-must be achieved if our epistemology is…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 101-111, (2007). INTENTI…
This commentary discusses critically the proposal of Foxall's intentional behaviorism that, when the use of intentional categories can be justifiably portrayed as heuristic overlay to theories incorporating radical behaviorist principles, intentionality…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 113-130, (2007). COMMENT…
Professor Foxall suggests the radical behaviorist language of contingencies is fine as far as it goes, and is quite suitable for matters of prediction and control. However, he argues that radical behaviorist language is extensional, and that it is neces…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 131-138 (2007). A BEHAVI…
According to Foxall (2007), simple acts may best be explained in terms of behavior of the organism as a whole, but complex behavioral patterns, usually described by mental terms, can only be explained by neurocognitive psychology, in which the mind is …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 139-148 (2007). BEHAVIOR…
Foxall's intentional behaviorism is supposed to provide explanation and understanding where radical behaviorism provides only prediction and control. Foxall does identify empirical and conceptual issues with the operant reinforcement framework, but he …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 149-183, (2007). THE THE…
This paper is a conceptual analysis of the theory debate in psychology, as carried out by cognitivists and radical behaviorists.
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 34, 1-17 (2006). NATURE, NUR…
Determining the degree to which persistent human behaviors and traits are the result of genetics or environment is important for a host of theoretical reasons in psychology. This article asks whether the results of such determinations are relevant to th…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 34, 19-37 (2006). B. F. SKIN…
B. F. Skinner's The Behavior of Organisms (1938/1966) and Walden Two (1948) are both positivistic. Skinner explicitly stated his approach was positivistic in The Behavior of Organisms although he did not make an explicit statement about Walden Two. Thr…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 34, 39-58 (2006). WHY NEURAL…
A central issue in philosophy and neuroscience is the problem of unified visual consciousness. This problem has arisen because we now know that an object's stimulus features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) generate activity in separate areas of …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 34, 59-70 (2006). ARE CURREN…
Two radically different families of theory currently compete for acceptance among theorists of human consciousness. The majority of theorists believe that the human brain somehow causes consciousness, but a significant minority holds that how the brain …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 34, 71-87 (2006). OF WHAT VA…
The book Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (2003) is an engaging criticism of cognitive neuroscience from the perspective of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of ordinary language. The authors' main claim is that assertions like "the brain sees" and …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 34, 89-107 (2006). CLASSIC E…
I analyze the theoretical tenets of early ethology and the criticisms leveled against it from comparative psychology. Early ethology had a clear research object, the study of behavioral adaptedness. Adaptedness was explained by the functional rules and …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 34, 109-121 (2006). HUMAN BE…
Language has been traditionally considered as a special psychological or behavioral phenomenon, with a logical status similar to other phenomena such as learning, memory, and thinking. Based on Wittgenstein's notion of language game, I argue that langu…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 33, vii-ix (2005). EDITORIAL…
An important role of the philosophy of science is to invite scientists to analyze their tacit networks. In the process, ambiguity may be exposed, missing steps in arguments identified, and unwarranted assumptions revealed. Attempts to solve these probl…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 33, 1-16 (2005). THE FUNCTIO…
This paper deals with the functions of intentional explanations of actions (IEAs), i.e., explanations that refer to intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) of the agent. IEAs can have different formats. We consider these different formats to be inst…
  Prev Page Page: 2/11   Next Page
Copyright ©1997-2017 by the Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies. All rights reserved.

The text of this website is available for modification and reuse under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0 Unported License and the GNU Free Documentation License.

быстрый займ на карту