Search Results for 'intentionality'


Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 43, 86-103 (2015). GOOGLE AN…
ABSTRACT: I argue that groups of people (not just individuals) can literally perform mental act such as strategizing and deciding. I do this by, first, explicating what it is for an entity to have mental states and perform mental acts. I then show how cer…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 103-105 (2011/2012). …
ABSTRACT: In contrast to Rakover's approach, I argue that intentional and extensional accounts of behavior are incommensurable, that the former are necessary only when the capacity of the latter to explain behavior cannot be empirically sustained, and tha…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 217-222 (2009). ASCRIBI…
Much of the commentary on my paper "Intentional behaviorism" (Foxall, 2007) fails to make contact with my central arguments about the use of intentional language in the explanation of behavior. Marr's (2008) remarks on my responses to that commentary (Fox…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 65-76 (2007). ABOUT ABOU…
The rationale, scientific necessity, and character of intentionality ascriptions (assertions that attribute beliefs, expectations, wishes and such to certain systems) remain unresolved issues in the philosophy of mind and psychology. Foxall's proposed r…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 77-92 (2007). GORDON FOX…
"Intentional behaviorism" is Gordon Foxall's name for his proposal to mix the oil of mentalist language with the water of empiricist behaviorism. The trouble is, oil and water don't mix. To remain scientific, the language of behavioral science must rema…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 101-111, (2007). INTENTI…
This commentary discusses critically the proposal of Foxall's intentional behaviorism that, when the use of intentional categories can be justifiably portrayed as heuristic overlay to theories incorporating radical behaviorist principles, intentionality…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 33, 17-40 (2005). THE REFLEX…
The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object or property X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself. This broadly behavioral perceptual theory explains perceptual int…
  Page: 1/1  
Copyright ©1997-2017 by the Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies. All rights reserved.

The text of this website is available for modification and reuse under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0 Unported License and the GNU Free Documentation License.

быстрый займ на карту