Search Results for 'intentional behaviorism'


Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 103-105 (2011/2012). …
ABSTRACT: In contrast to Rakover's approach, I argue that intentional and extensional accounts of behavior are incommensurable, that the former are necessary only when the capacity of the latter to explain behavior cannot be empirically sustained, and tha…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 217-222 (2009). ASCRIBI…
Much of the commentary on my paper "Intentional behaviorism" (Foxall, 2007) fails to make contact with my central arguments about the use of intentional language in the explanation of behavior. Marr's (2008) remarks on my responses to that commentary (Fox…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 113-155 (2008). INTENTIO…
The central fact in the delineation of radical behaviorism is its conceptual avoidance of propositional content. This eschewal of the intentional stance sets it apart not only from cognitivism but from other neo-behaviorisms. Indeed, the defining charac…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 1-55, (2007). INTENTIONA…
This paper proposes an overarching philosophical framework for the analysis and interpretation of behavior that incorporates both radical behaviorism and intentional psychology in a model, "intentional behaviorism"' that additionally links the explanati…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 57-60, (2007).COMMENTARY…
Foxall's incorrect claims about behavior analysis (2007) arise from a failure to understand the stance of behavior analysis. Behavior analysis is the science of behavior; it is about behavior and not about organisms. It views behavioral events as natura…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 65-76 (2007). ABOUT ABOU…
The rationale, scientific necessity, and character of intentionality ascriptions (assertions that attribute beliefs, expectations, wishes and such to certain systems) remain unresolved issues in the philosophy of mind and psychology. Foxall's proposed r…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 77-92 (2007). GORDON FOX…
"Intentional behaviorism" is Gordon Foxall's name for his proposal to mix the oil of mentalist language with the water of empiricist behaviorism. The trouble is, oil and water don't mix. To remain scientific, the language of behavioral science must rema…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 101-111, (2007). INTENTI…
This commentary discusses critically the proposal of Foxall's intentional behaviorism that, when the use of intentional categories can be justifiably portrayed as heuristic overlay to theories incorporating radical behaviorist principles, intentionality…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 131-138 (2007). A BEHAVI…
According to Foxall (2007), simple acts may best be explained in terms of behavior of the organism as a whole, but complex behavioral patterns, usually described by mental terms, can only be explained by neurocognitive psychology, in which the mind is …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 139-148 (2007). BEHAVIOR…
Foxall's intentional behaviorism is supposed to provide explanation and understanding where radical behaviorism provides only prediction and control. Foxall does identify empirical and conceptual issues with the operant reinforcement framework, but he …
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