Search Results for 'Behavior and Philosophy'


Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 42, 1-26 (2014). CAN WE RESP…
ABSTRACT: I critically review Bruce N. Waller's Against Moral Responsibility (2011), in which he argues that the moral responsibility system can and ought to be abandoned and that it be replaced with a take-charge responsibility system. Taking the perspec…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 89-92 (2011/2012). CO…
ABSTRACT: Rakover argues that both mechanistic and mentalistic accounts are needed to explain behavior, and his position is based mainly on the fact that physical and mentalistic accounts have existed throughout recorded history, yet all attempts to recon…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 38, 117-119 (2010). REMARKS.…
In order to stimulate informal discussion of behaviorism among the readership, we have invited Murray Sidman to let us have his comments on the current scene as a regular feature of this journal. He has accepted. The following remarks constitute the body …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 105-117 (2009). PRIVATE …
What are "private events" and what is their significance? The term is B. F. Skinner's, but the idea is much older. Before J. B. Watson challenged their methods and their metaphysics, virtually all psychologists assumed that the only way to discover a pers…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 119-125 (2009). WHY DIS…
This commentary discusses the major claims and arguments presented by Field and Hineline (2008) against the general use of dispositional causal explanations in science and psychology and in favor of an alternative account that applies to cases in which ca…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 127-133 (2009). PRAGMATI…
I am in agreement with Field and Hineline's excellent essay (2008) concerning the limitations of cause-effect explanation and the derivative problems with person-centered accounts of human action. However, their account is simultaneously limited by its co…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 135-140 (2009). DISPOSIT…
Field and Hineline use the term dispositioning to refer to the tendency to privilege spatially and temporally local entities in psychological explanation. In our commentary we offer reasons for agreeing with their claim that dispositioning is overly preva…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 141-147 (2009). BEYOND …
Field and Hineline (2008) develop a full-scale account of the conditions under which speakers in our culture-in the vernacular as well as in the more technical parlance of psychological theory-explain behavior by appealing to contiguous events or, in thei…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 149-150 (2009). ON EXPLA…
Field and Hineline (2008) offer a sympathetic explanation for the resistance of psychologists and philosophers to explaining behavior as temporally organized phenomena occurring as a function of other events, also often distributed over time. This resista…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 151-155 (2009). HOW SHA…
Field and Hineline have shown how pervasive and insidious is the tendency to make dispositional attributions, even among those who criticize the practice, and they identify a bias for models of contiguous causation as one reason for this tendency. They ar…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 157-163 (2009). "BEHAVI…
Behavior analysis ironically appears to be increasingly at risk for abandoning its historic focus of moment-to-moment behaving, to other disciplines ranging from robotics and the "man-machine interface" to cognitive science where behaving is called "actio…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 165-180 (2009). NATURALI…
In an earlier essay in this journal, the estimable John Staddon charges B. F. Skinner and E. O. Wilson with committing several fallacies while promoting evolutionary ethics. The present essay replies that what Staddon regards as fallacies are signal contr…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 181-185 (2009). FAITH A…
Professor Hocutt and I agree that David Hume first pointed out that "ought"-what should be done-cannot be derived from "is"-what is the case. Hocutt goes on to claim that "ought," in fact, derives from factual observation of "what we care about," which am…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 187-194 (2009). VALUES: …
In his spirited "Faith and Goodness" (this issue), John Staddon says that my defense of B. F. Skinner's definition of the good-as what has the potential to reinforce desire for it-overlooks the fact that people sometimes desire the wrong things. Staddon a…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 195-216 (2009). MORAL AG…
Arguably, one of the most exciting recent advances in moral philosophy is the ongoing scientific naturalization of normative ethics and metaethics, in particular moral psychology. A relatively neglected area in these improvements that is centrally importa…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 217-222 (2009). ASCRIBI…
Much of the commentary on my paper "Intentional behaviorism" (Foxall, 2007) fails to make contact with my central arguments about the use of intentional language in the explanation of behavior. Marr's (2008) remarks on my responses to that commentary (Fox…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 1-4 (2008). PETER HARZEM…
Peter was a wonderful human being who showed us through his intelligence, scholarship, wit, and honesty that psychology has a long way to go. All of us will miss him in this journey.
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 5-69 (2008). DISPOSITION…
"Now" is privileged in most psychological theories, which portray their processes as proceeding from moment-to-moment. As in any science, this adherence to contiguous causation hinders an account of phenomena that involve remote events or temporally ex…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 71-85 (2008). DRETSKE ON…
In two recent articles and an earlier book Fred Dretske appeals to a distinction between triggering and structuring causes with the aim of establishing that psychological explanations of behavior differ from non-psychological ones. He concludes that int…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 87-96 (2008). THE CONCEP…
The history of psychology has seen recurrent controversies on the circularity of reinforcement explanations, and behavior analysts disagree among themselves as to whether the concept of operant reinforcement is explanatory or descriptive. Some behavior …
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 97-111 (2008). THE NATUR…
Philosophers and psychologists have debated what is meant by free will as well as the nature of human choice. However, only recently have data been gathered to consider common usage of the term; our data support college students' belief in free will as i…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 113-155 (2008). INTENTIO…
The central fact in the delineation of radical behaviorism is its conceptual avoidance of propositional content. This eschewal of the intentional stance sets it apart not only from cognitivism but from other neo-behaviorisms. Indeed, the defining charac…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 157-168 (2008). THE ABDI…
What follows is a reply to a reply and, as such, necessarily derives, at least in part, from the comments of Foxall's critics. However, I tried to review Foxall's reply as a "new" paper standing on its own merits and, as such, I wanted to respond to it…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 1-55, (2007). INTENTIONA…
This paper proposes an overarching philosophical framework for the analysis and interpretation of behavior that incorporates both radical behaviorism and intentional psychology in a model, "intentional behaviorism"' that additionally links the explanati…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 57-60, (2007).COMMENTARY…
Foxall's incorrect claims about behavior analysis (2007) arise from a failure to understand the stance of behavior analysis. Behavior analysis is the science of behavior; it is about behavior and not about organisms. It views behavioral events as natura…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 61-64, (2007). ARE FOXAL…
Foxall's argument that behavioristic and intentional approaches should be hybridized rests on his views about the inability of a behavioristic position to deal with several features of behavior, including its continuity through time. My commentary sugg…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 65-76 (2007). ABOUT ABOU…
The rationale, scientific necessity, and character of intentionality ascriptions (assertions that attribute beliefs, expectations, wishes and such to certain systems) remain unresolved issues in the philosophy of mind and psychology. Foxall's proposed r…
Resource: Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 77-92 (2007). GORDON FOX…
"Intentional behaviorism" is Gordon Foxall's name for his proposal to mix the oil of mentalist language with the water of empiricist behaviorism. The trouble is, oil and water don't mix. To remain scientific, the language of behavioral science must rema…
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