Scholarship

Get Help

Behavior and Philosophy



PDF

Download
Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 157-163 (2009). "BEHAVIOR STREAMS" VERSUS "BEHAVIOR EXTENDED IN TIME", Charles P. Shimp.
Behavior analysis ironically appears to be increasingly at risk for abandoning its historic focus of moment-to-moment behaving, to other disciplines ranging from robotics and the "man-machine interface" to cognitive science where behaving is called "action." The misleadingly labeled "molar" analysis and the concept of "behavior extended in time" both signal this abandonment of behaving. I suggest that it would be premature to assume that moment-to-moment analyses and analyses of ―behavior extended in time‖ are on different and independent levels. I also suggest that behavior analysts might regain their focus on actual behaving by occasionally reading Pigeons in a Pelican (Skinner, 1960) and Farewell, My LOVELY (Skinner, 1976) and by developing and evaluating behaving theories.
PDF

Download
Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 165-180 (2009). NATURALIST MORAL THEORY: A REPLY TO STADDON, Max Hocutt.
In an earlier essay in this journal, the estimable John Staddon charges B. F. Skinner and E. O. Wilson with committing several fallacies while promoting evolutionary ethics. The present essay replies that what Staddon regards as fallacies are signal contributions to a naturalistic understanding of ethical choice and language.
PDF

Download
Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 181-185 (2009). FAITH AND GOODNESS: A REPLY TO HOCUTT, J.E.R. Staddon.
Professor Hocutt and I agree that David Hume first pointed out that "ought"-what should be done-cannot be derived from "is"-what is the case. Hocutt goes on to claim that "ought," in fact, derives from factual observation of "what we care about," which amounts to saying "you should do what you want to do." This seems to me unsatisfactory as moral philosophy.
PDF

Download
Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 187-194 (2009). VALUES: A REPLY TO STADDON'S "FAITH AND GOODNESS", Max Hocutt
In his spirited "Faith and Goodness" (this issue), John Staddon says that my defense of B. F. Skinner's definition of the good-as what has the potential to reinforce desire for it-overlooks the fact that people sometimes desire the wrong things. Staddon appears to agree with G. E. Moore that the good should, rather, be equated with what is worthy of being desired, so ought to be desired, whether it ever is desired or not. But since there is no objective test of worthiness, Moore's ought can only mean "I, and folk like me, desire that others desire what we desire that they desire."1 When the talk is of values, there is no getting away from desires.2
PDF

Download
Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 195-216 (2009). MORAL AGENCY AND MORAL LEARNING: TRANSFORMING METAETHICS FROM A FIRST TO A SECOND PHILOSOPHY ENTERPRISE, William A. Rottschaefer
Arguably, one of the most exciting recent advances in moral philosophy is the ongoing scientific naturalization of normative ethics and metaethics, in particular moral psychology. A relatively neglected area in these improvements that is centrally important for developing a scientifically based naturalistic metaethics concerns the nature and acquisition of successful moral agency. In this paper I lay out two examples of how empirically based findings help us to understand and explain some cases of successful moral agency. These are research in moral internalization and aggression management. Using these examples, I sketch some lessons for investigating successful moral learning and moral action. My proposal reflects a common theme in scientifically based philosophy generally: the shift from the armchair methods of analyzing concepts and finding a priori foundations, the enterprise of first philosophy, to an effort to study the phenomena themselves, using empirical findings and theories to answer philosophical
PDF

Download
Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 217-222 (2009). ASCRIBING INTENTIONALITY, Gordon R. Foxall.
Much of the commentary on my paper "Intentional behaviorism" (Foxall, 2007) fails to make contact with my central arguments about the use of intentional language in the explanation of behavior. Marr's (2008) remarks on my responses to that commentary (Foxall, 2008) also fail to address my original assertions. Both commentary and remarks tilt at windmills that were not in the landscape I described or hinted at in the solutions I proposed. I attempt here to map out my argument more clearly.
PDF

Download
Behavior and Philosophy, 36, vii-viii (2008). PREFACE
PDF

Download
Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 1-4 (2008). PETER HARZEM (1930-2008): A REVERENCE FOR LANGUAGE, Emilio Ribes-Inesta.
Peter was a wonderful human being who showed us through his intelligence, scholarship, wit, and honesty that psychology has a long way to go. All of us will miss him in this journey.
PDF

Download
Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 5-69 (2008). DISPOSITIONING AND THE OBSCURED ROLES OF TIME IN PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS, Douglas P. Field & Philip N. Hineline.
"Now" is privileged in most psychological theories, which portray their processes as proceeding from moment-to-moment. As in any science, this adherence to contiguous causation hinders an account of phenomena that involve remote events or temporally extended organization. In addition, our scientific discourse is framed by the everyday patterns we have learned in explaining our own actions and those of others, yielding a bipolar constraint of explanatory language. Thus, tripolar relations among organism, environment and behavior are reduced to cause-effect, noun-verb, agent-action. This imposes exclusionary emphases upon organism-based or upon environment-based terms as accounting for behavior. Especially with remote causation or temporal dispersion, implicitly assumed contiguous causation appears to be defended through a practice we have called "dispositioning."
PDF

Download
Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 71-85 (2008). DRETSKE ON THE CAUSATION OF BEHAVIOR, Constantine Sandis.
In two recent articles and an earlier book Fred Dretske appeals to a distinction between triggering and structuring causes with the aim of establishing that psychological explanations of behavior differ from non-psychological ones. He concludes that intentional human behavior is triggered by electro-chemical events but structured by representational facts. In this paper I argue that while this underrated causalist position is considerably more persuasive than the standard causalist alternative, Dretske's account fails to provide us with a coherent analysis of intentional action and its explanation.
Copyright ©1997-2017 by the Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies. All rights reserved.

The text of this website is available for modification and reuse under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0 Unported License and the GNU Free Documentation License.

Что выбрать? Онлайн или реальные слоты? Как обыграть казино?