EDITORIAL: ULLIN PLACE, 1924-2000

Phil Reed

University College London

As most of the readers of this journal doubtless will know already, sadly Ullin Place died early into the new Millennium. Along with many others, I thought that it might be fitting to organize a tribute both to Ullin and to the work that he inspired. As Ullin published much of his work in *Behavior and Philosophy*, it is an appropriate tribute to dedicate to him this and a subsequent special edition of the journal. The articles contained in these editions concern both Ullin Place’s work itself, and the many themes that emerge from and are related to this work. Hence, *Behavior and Philosophy* is proud to dedicate this edition to the memory of Ullin Place, and to the ongoing work in the many fields that he illuminated. Our thanks are extended to all of those who contributed to this special edition for Ullin, and to the symposium held in honor of Ullin at the Fourth European meeting of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior Group in Amiens, 2000. On a personal note, I am honored to have played a small part in this tribute, as well as deeply saddened at Ullin’s death and the thought that the tribute came too late for Ullin himself to enjoy.

Ullin Place was born in 1924, in Yorkshire, England. A fact of which he was most proud, as are most of we Yorkshiremen. He attended Oxford University, where he came under the influence of Rylean Behavior Analysis. This view was to exert an influence over his own work, although it was a view that he did not adopt either unchanged or uncritically. This ability to critically analyze and constructively re-interpret was later applied to many facets of Radical Behaviorism. Following his time at Oxford, Ullin subsequently moved into Clinical Psychology and became a lecturer at the University of Leeds. During this time he engaged the mind-body problem, publishing the seminal “*Is Consciousness a Brain Process?*” in 1956. Ullin also developed his thoughts about behavioral accounts of language acquisition, and in 1981 published “*Skinner’s Verbal Behavior I—Why We Need It.*” Less well known, although equally important, Place also lectured widely on the importance of the topic of intenTionality and circulated several important articles on this topic. After he retired from teaching, Ullin continued serious research at the University of Bangor, where he applied his critical faculties to the emerging area of stimulus equivalence.

Despite his great academic activity and immense productivity, Ullin continued to “have a life” (a feat that escapes many noted academics). He enjoyed international travel, and would engage anybody, anywhere, anytime in debate.

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AUTHOR’S NOTE: Please address all correspondence to Phil Reed, Department of Psychology, University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT, UK. Email: p.reed@ucl.ac.uk.
Ullin also managed to become somewhat adept at keeping sheep at his Yorkshire home. Throughout his career he was with, and was supported by his wife Peggy, to whom go our condolences and thanks.

For those readers with a recognition of Ullin’s name, but with only a limited knowledge of his work, this edition should provide some background to the breadth of Ullin’s major contributions to the field of Behavioral Psychology. Three of these areas, briefly mentioned above and worth re-emphasizing, underlie much of the contemporary debates in the fields connected with Ullin’s work.

It would not be overstating the case to suggest that he is the father of contemporary Philosophy of Mind, much of that field being a response to his “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” article. Indeed, it could be argued that modern Neuropsychology (or Cognitive Neuropsychology, of which he would disapprove deeply) would not be the dominant field it is today, were it not for the interest that this article rekindled in materialism.

Perhaps even more importantly, I remember as an undergraduate, Ullin being one of the very few people outside the immediate Skinnerian camp who was prepared to discuss and defend Skinner’s “Verbal Behavior.” Ullin’s work in this field not only refined the original analysis of this critical area for Behavioral Psychology, but also, as much as anything else, paved the way for contemporary thinking on the relationship between language and human “conditioned” behavior. This latter area has developed into one of the key empirical fields in the contemporary experimental analysis of behavior, especially in the area of equivalence class formation.

Finally, Place’s more technically “philosophical” work on intentionality and intensionality, which clarified numerous conceptual and logical confusions, is in the area of theory of mind, and this work has had major implications for cognitive science.

The five contributions in the present special issue of Behavior and Philosophy cover many of the important areas listed above. These articles are:

1. Broad and Deep, but Always Rigorous: Some Appreciative Reflections on Ullin Place’s Contributions to Behavior Analysis, by Julian Leslie.
2. On Psychological Terms that Appeal to the Mental, by Jay Moore.
4. The Persistence of Category Mistakes in Psychology, by Per Holth.

The first of these articles, written by Leslie, neatly summarizes and integrates two of the important problems that engaged Ullin’s thinking for most of his career. These strands of thinking were concerned with the “Identity Theory” solution to the mind-body problem and the importance of language to understanding human behavior. These two themes re-emerge in the next two papers contained in this edition, both of which take the ideas worked on by Place, and mentioned by Leslie,
and discuss them in the context of contemporary problems for Behavioral Philosophy. Moore discusses the important notion of privacy and its relationship to the language that we use for mental states and events. Stemmer discusses an important variant of the materialist approach to the mind-body problem, namely, Quine’s “Repudiation Theory.” The central role of theorizing about the mind-body problem in Ullin’s work is taken up again in the paper by Holth. This article places the kind of work produced by Ullin on mental terms in the wider context of the Analytic Behaviorism, which was often associated with Gilbert Ryle.

The above articles by Moore, Stemmer, and Holth focus on the first of Ullin’s major contributions that I noted at the start of this introduction, namely, his identity theory and its implications for behavioral accounts of “mind.” However, the link to the second of Ullin’s interests noted above, language, is also apparent in these articles. This important strand of work is explicitly highlighted in the final paper contained in this edition. The Dickins’ account of stimulus equivalence and meaning stresses the debt that this field owes to Ullin’s views on language and equivalence. This latter paper also serves to offer many fascinating links to other fields and approaches to this topic. Such an approach to our field is one of which Ullin would have approved, and one which returns us to the title of the overview of Ullin’s thinking contained in the first article in this special edition of the journal.

Of course, it is a hopeless task to try to cover all of the areas of work on which Ullin engaged during his lifetime. Most of these areas are still deeply central to behavioral theorizing today. However, it is hoped that the first of the two special editions of Behavior and Philosophy that are concerned with Ullin’s contributions will serve to illustrate the ongoing debt that we all owe to thinkers such as Ullin Place. The areas that have not been mentioned in this edition, for example, Ullin’s early work in Clinical Psychology, his interest in intentionality, and his views about the subsequent direction of behavioral work, will be highlighted in the second issue.

It is the best tribute that I can think of to say that Ullin’s thoughts not only have helped to shape our field, but also will find an echo in behavioral theorizing throughout the new Millennium.

References