Add Video Resource

journals



PDF Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 101-111, (2007). INTENTIONAL BEHAVIORISM AND THE INTENTIONAL SCHEME: COMMENTS ON GORDON R. FOXALL'S "INTENTIONAL BEHAVIORISM", Hugh Lacey.
This commentary discusses critically the proposal of Foxall's intentional behaviorism that, when the use of intentional categories can be justifiably portrayed as heuristic overlay to theories incorporating radical behaviorist principles, intentionality may be part of behaviorist interpretations of behavior that occurs outside of the controlled conditions of the laboratory and practical behavioral interventions. I sketch an argument that typical uses of intentional categories for the explanation of human agency (e.g., its exercise in conducting scientific research) are not properly grasped as being such heuristic overlay and so are not illuminated by behaviorist interpretations.
Basic Research , Neuroscience , Philosophy/History
Advanced Study

Download
PDF Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 113-130, (2007). COMMENTS ON "NTENTIONAL BEHAVIORISM" BY G. R. FOXALL, J. Moore.
Professor Foxall suggests the radical behaviorist language of contingencies is fine as far as it goes, and is quite suitable for matters of prediction and control. However, he argues that radical behaviorist language is extensional, and that it is necessary to formally incorporate the intentional idiom into the language of behavioral science to promote explanations and interpretations of behavior that are comprehensive in scope. Notwithstanding Professor Foxall's arguments, radical behaviorists hold that the circumstances identified by the use of the intentional idiom are accommodated by the radical behaviorist language of contingencies, not only for prediction and control but also for explanations and interpretations. Of central importance is that individuals may have histories that lead them to generate descriptions of past and present behavior, as well as descriptions of prevailing circumstances that have caused that behavior or are likely to cause that behavior in the future. The resulting verb
Basic Research , Neuroscience , Philosophy/History
Advanced Study

Download
PDF Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 131-138 (2007). A BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE OF MENTAL LIFE: COMMENTS ON FOXALL'S "INTENTIONAL BEHAVIORISM," Howard Rachlin.
According to Foxall (2007), simple acts may best be explained in terms of behavior of the organism as a whole, but complex behavioral patterns, usually described by mental terms, can only be explained by neurocognitive psychology, in which the mind is conceived as an internal mechanism. This proposed division of psychological labor is faulty, first because there is no distinct dividing line between simple (non-mental) and complex (mental) behavior, and second because behavioral psychology alone or neurocognitive psychology alone can describe both simple and complex behavioral patterns. The neurocognitive approach to the mind is based on a science of efficient causes. A post-Skinnerian behavioral approach to the mind, "teleological behaviorism," is based on a science of final causes. Teleological behaviorism studies mental life itself while neurocognitivism studies its underlying mechanism. Both are required for a complete understanding of the mind.
Basic Research , Neuroscience , Philosophy/History
Advanced Study

Download
PDF Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 139-148 (2007). BEHAVIORISM AND CHISHOLM'S CHALLENGE, Francois Tonneau.
Foxall's intentional behaviorism is supposed to provide explanation and understanding where radical behaviorism provides only prediction and control. Foxall does identify empirical and conceptual issues with the operant reinforcement framework, but he underestimates the extent of its flaws and partly misidentifies their nature. His intentional behaviorism suffers from conceptual difficulties, and its adherence to a form of instrumentalism may actually make it harder to understand intentional phenomena.
Basic Research , Neuroscience , Philosophy/History
Advanced Study

Download
PDF Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 149-183, (2007). THE THEORY DEBATE IN PSYCHOLOGY, Jose E. Burgos.
This paper is a conceptual analysis of the theory debate in psychology, as carried out by cognitivists and radical behaviorists.
Basic Research , Neuroscience , Philosophy/History
Advanced Study

Download
PDF Behavior and Philosophy, 34, 1-17 (2006). NATURE, NURTURE, AND INDIVIDUAL CHANGE, John D. Mullen.
Determining the degree to which persistent human behaviors and traits are the result of genetics or environment is important for a host of theoretical reasons in psychology. This article asks whether the results of such determinations are relevant to the practical tasks of individual change as attempted, for example, through therapy, parenting techniques, or self-transformation. Examples from the psychological literature on happiness or "subjective well-being" illustrate the common idea that a trait being largely genetic implies that it is more difficult to modify than one that is largely environmental. The most widely known theoretical approach to disentangling genetic from environmental effects in humans is behavioral genetics, with its central concept of heritability (h2). This article argues that measures of h2 do not predict the ease or difficulty of modifying behaviors or traits of individuals. A concept different from h2, that of innateness, is explicated, but it, too, is found not to be a u
Basic Research , Neuroscience , Philosophy/History
Advanced Study

Download
PDF Behavior and Philosophy, 34, 19-37 (2006). B. F. SKINNER'S OTHER POSITIVISTIC BOOK:WALDEN TWO, Roy A. Moxley.
B. F. Skinner's The Behavior of Organisms (1938/1966) and Walden Two (1948) are both positivistic. Skinner explicitly stated his approach was positivistic in The Behavior of Organisms although he did not make an explicit statement about Walden Two. Three features of positivism are elaborated-its concern with indisputable certitude, unified reality, and ever-onward progress, each of which entailed overly simplifying assumptions. These features are brought out in the positivistic sources for Walden Two and in the changes from the positivistic views of Frazier, the protagonist in Walden Two, to Skinner's later pragmatic-selectionist views.
Basic Research , Neuroscience , Philosophy/History
Advanced Study

Download
PDF Behavior and Philosophy, 34, 39-58 (2006). WHY NEURAL SYNCHRONY FAILS TO EXPLAIN THE UNITY OF VISUAL CONSCIOUSNESS, Eric LaRock.
A central issue in philosophy and neuroscience is the problem of unified visual consciousness. This problem has arisen because we now know that an object's stimulus features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) generate activity in separate areas of the visual cortex (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). For example, recent evidence indicates that there are very few, if any, neural connections between specific visual areas, such as those that correlate with color and motion (Bartels & Zeki, 2006; Zeki, 2003). So how do unified objects arise in visual consciousness? Some neuroscientists propose that neural synchrony is the mechanism that binds an object's features into a unity (e.g., see Crick, 1994; Crick & Koch, 1990; Engel, 2003; Roelfsema, 1998; Singer, 1996; von der Malsburg, 1996, 1999). I argue, on both empirical and philosophical grounds, that neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness.
Basic Research , Neuroscience , Philosophy/History
Advanced Study

Download
PDF Behavior and Philosophy, 34, 59-70 (2006). ARE CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS USEFUL TO NEUROSCIENTISTS? Philip R. Sullivan.
Two radically different families of theory currently compete for acceptance among theorists of human consciousness. The majority of theorists believe that the human brain somehow causes consciousness, but a significant minority holds that how the brain would cause this property is not only currently incomprehensible, but unlikely to become comprehensible despite continuing advances in brain science. Some of these latter theorists hold an alternate view that consciousness may well be one of the fundamentals in nature, and that the extremely complex functional systems of the human brain inform this basic property, giving rise to our specifically human variety thereof. If these contesting families of theory are to be useful to neuroscientists, testable notions flowing from these theories need to be developed.
Basic Research , Neuroscience , Philosophy/History
Advanced Study

Download
PDF Behavior and Philosophy, 34, 71-87 (2006). OF WHAT VALUE IS PHILOSOPHY TO SCIENCE? A REVIEW OF MAX R. BENNETT AND P. M. S. HACKER'S PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE (MALDEN, MA: BLACKWELL, 2003), Jose E. Burgos & John W. Donahoe.
The book Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (2003) is an engaging criticism of cognitive neuroscience from the perspective of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of ordinary language. The authors' main claim is that assertions like "the brain sees" and "the left hemisphere thinks" are integral to cognitive neuroscience but that they are meaningless because they commit the mereological fallacy-ascribing to parts of humans, properties that make sense to predicate only of whole humans. The authors claim that this fallacy is at the heart of Cartesian dualism, implying that current cognitive neuroscientists are Cartesian dualists. Against this claim, we argue that the fallacy cannot be committed within Cartesian dualism either, for this doctrine does not allow for an intelligible way of asserting that a soul is part of a human being. Also, the authors' Aristotelian essentialistic outlook is at odds with their Wittgensteinian stance, and we were unconvinced by their case against explanatory reductionism.
Basic Research , Neuroscience , Philosophy/History
Advanced Study

Download
Copyright ©1997-2018 by the Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies. All rights reserved.

The text of this website is available for modification and reuse under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0 Unported License and the GNU Free Documentation License.

микрозаймы онлайн займы на карту займы по паспорту