
"Behavior" Does Not Mean "Behavior of the Organism": Why Conceptual Revision is Needed in Behavior Analysis
Vicki L. Lee
Monash University
ABSTRACT: This paper considers two different meanings of the word behavior
and the implications of these meanings for how we talk about behavior. The paper argues that
discussions about social justice issues would be more effective if these implications were fully
grasped. The paper begins by discussing the etymologically-original meaning of behavior,
which equates the word with conduct. A second meaning of behavior, introduced
when early psychologists attempted to make usage of behavior in psychology consistent with
its usage in other sciences, is then discussed. The paper shows that behavior analysts tacitly
accept this second meaning when they theorize about operant data. Acceptance is illustrated by
discussing the traditional emphasis on body movements ahead of effects and the concept of operant
behavior. The paper then reiterates Skinner's emphasis on the central place of data in developing
a conceptual framework. It argues that operant data represent changes in the state of various
objects that depend on an object and on a participant, among other constituents, which is
consistent with the implications of the etymologically-original meaning of behavior. The
paper concludes that reformulating behavior analysis to make its theoretical claims consistent with the
etymologically-original meaning of behavior would make discussions about social justice
issues considerably more widely accessible.
View entire article as Adobe Acrobat portable document format (pdf) file. Format and page numbers are the same as the printed article in Volume 9 (1&2).
Back to Behavior and Social Issues Current Online Articles page