

PREFACE

I wish to thank all who have submitted papers to *Behavior and Philosophy* over the last year and those who have devoted their time serving as reviewers. The issues raised in these papers and their scholarly and thoughtful assessment resonate perfectly with the goals of this journal and reflect the best it has to offer for the reader interested in what modern behaviorism and its challenges are about.

Our issue begins with a moving tribute to Peter Harzem by his friend and colleague Emilio Ribes-Iñesta. Peter served on the *Behavior and Philosophy* board of reviewers for many years. For those who knew Peter well, Emilio's recognition will bring back many happy memories of Peter's unique blend of wit and wisdom as well as his uncompromising, scholarly, and articulate attacks on fuzzy thinking and absurdities, especially within the behaviorist community. His engaging and pointed assessments kept us on our conceptual toes and challenged us to achieve greater clarity in characterizing what behaviorism should be about.

If pressed to name a common theme to the rest of the papers in this issue I would venture "patterns of explanation of behavior." In their extensive review "Dispositioning and the Obscured Roles of Time in Psychological Explanations" Field and Hineline treat this theme from two connected perspectives, causation over extended time scales and sources of attribution (dispositional versus environmental). The goal is to understand behavior without appeals to autonomous agency—the *bête noir* of any natural science of behavior worthy of the name. The paper teems with provocative ideas and I shall be soliciting commentary from interested scholars to appear in next year's issue along with a reply by Hineline (Field, sadly, is deceased—an obviously promising career cut short).

In his paper "Dretske on the Causation of Behavior" Sandis critically examines Dretske's "triggering" and "structuring" causes of behavior and, in particular, intentional acts. He shows that Dretske's account of such acts is insufficient to define what counts and what does not count as an intentional act.

Tonneau's paper "The Concept of Reinforcement: Explanatory or Descriptive?" takes on two old issues in behavior analysis, namely, accusations of circularity of the concept of reinforcement, presumably rendering it explanatorily empty; and whether behavior-analytic formulations, particularly involving reinforcement, are only "descriptive" as opposed to "explanatory." By unpacking how "explanation" is typically used in science, Tonneau argues that the behavior-analytic concept of reinforcement is both descriptive *and* explanatory.

The Ogletree and Oberle paper "The Nature, Common Usage, and Implications of Free Will and Determinism" may be the first empirical paper ever published in this journal, though, to my knowledge, there has never been a prohibition of such studies. The authors, by suitably framing the terms "free will" and "determinism," surveyed college students to determine how these terms are typically understood and their implications for assignment of responsibility. While the results do not clarify any philosophical or scientific issues, they do, in some

sense, reflect common opinions on topics of considerable public and private concern. Those who teach these topics, as many of our readers do, confront just the sorts of confused opinions and reasoning found in these empirical studies. Most students have not really given these issues any careful thought (if they ever thought about them at all) despite their powerful implications for understanding what a science of behavior entails.

Foxall's paper "Intentional Behaviorism" occasioned quite provocative responses in our last issue of *Behavior and Philosophy*, and with this issue in "Intentional Behaviorism Revisited" Foxall offers an extensive reply to those commentaries. In doing so I believe he clarifies some of the more difficult arguments he presented in the original article. Curiously, the paper by Field and Hineline, without solicitation for that purpose, serves as an additional commentary on Foxall, particularly on the topic of what he calls continuity.

With respect to "Intentional Behaviorism," as Editor I tried to remain relatively above the fray and let the critics respond to it as Foxall had initially presented it. Reviewing his replies to those critics, however, I was compelled to join in with my own reply to his replies as presented in my "The Abdication of Belief: A Comment on Foxall's Replies to his Critics." Foxall is, of course, invited to respond in the next issue.

Finally, I want to urge all of you who find this journal worth reading to consider it as a significant venue for your work and thus submit your papers, reviews, and commentaries for our consideration.

M. Jackson Marr
Editor