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The philosophy and history section is devoted to the philosophical, historical, metaphysical, and methodological foundations of the study of behavior, brain, and mind. Here you will find articles from our flagship journal Behavior and Philosophy, as well as critical or historical reviews, videos on apparatus, and other resourceShow More

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Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, vii-viii (2011/2012). EDITOR
Tags: Behavior and Philosophy, 2011/2012, Jay Moore, Marta Leon
Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 1-16 (2011). A BEHAVIORIST ACCOUNT OF EMOTIONS AND FEELINGS: MAKING SENSE OF JAMES D. LAIRD'S FEELINGS: THE PERCEPTION OF SELF. Eric P. Charles, Michael D. Bybee and Nicholas S. Thompson.
ABSTRACT: In Feelings: The Perception of Self, Laird deftly synthesizes decades of research supporting the self-perception theory of emotion and feeling, providing an account of these phenomenon that is compatible with radical behaviorism. Beginning with William James, Laird builds a system in which "emotions" are ways of acting in situations and "feelings" are responses to those environment/behavior pairings. However, Laird sometimes hesitates to present the strong conclusions that flow from his evidence and his premises. The evidence leads forcefully to the conclusion that behaviors cause feelings and that feelings are simply another form of behaving. This puts Laird's work squarely in the behaviorist lineages that grow out of James's work and includes the efforts of Holt, F. Allport, Tolman, Gibson, Skinner, and the emerging Radical Embodied Cognitive Science.
Tags: Behavior and Philosophy, radical behaviorism, emotion, feeling, self-perception, embodied cognition, Eric charles, Michael Bybee, Nicholas Thompson
Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 17-43 (2011/2012). A PLEA FOR METHODOLOGICAL DUALISM AND A MULTI-EXPLANATION FRAMEWORK IN PSYCHOLOGY. Sam S. Rakover
At present there is no explanation for the mind/brain relationship; it is hard to conceive mentalistic explanations in terms of mechanistic explanations, where mechanistic explanations refer to explanations common in the sciences such as neurophysiological and computational, and mentalistic explanations are based on the individual's inner world such as will, belief, intention, and purpose. It is also difficult to provide a comprehensive explanation of behavior and its components by an appeal to mechanistic explanations only. It therefore it makes sense to develop a new methodological approach, Methodological Dualism, which leads to the construction of a Multi-Explanation Framework for developing specific psychological theories. This approach is not based on the usual attempt to reduce mental processes to neurophysiological processes. On the contrary, it addresses behavior by means of multiple explanations (mechanistic and mentalistic) which are not reducible to each other but still satisfy the methodological
Tags: Behavior and Philosophy, methodology, explanation, philosophy of science, mind, and of psychology, Sam S. Rakover
Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 45-67 (2011). AN ENACTIVE ACCOUNT OF THE PERCEPTION OF FACTS. Aaron Allen Schiller.
ABSTRACT: Building off of the enactive account of perception recently developed by Alva No
Tags: Behavior and Philosophy, perception, the enactive account, object perception, property perception, fact perception, Alva No
Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 69-81 (2011). THE BROAD PERCEPTION MODEL AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF QUALIA. Ren
The transparency of qualia to introspection has been given as reason for favoring a representationalist view of phenomenal character. Qualia realists, notably Block (1996, 2000), A.D. Smith (2008), and Kind (2003, 2008), have denied that qualia are transparent. What is clear is that the phenomenology of introspection alone cannot decide the case, but a theory of introspection could. If the qualia realist could show that our introspective access to mental properties is akin to the perceptual access we have to perceived properties, then she has grounds for denying the transparency claim. On the other hand, if introspection does not provide access to intrinsic mental properties, then the representationalist has a basis for defending the transparency claim. Armstrong's theory of introspection has been taken to be typical of perceptual theories; however, this paper will give reasons for thinking not only that his theory does not in fact constitute a perceptual theory but that such theories of introspection do no
Tags: Behavior and Philosophy, introspection, Sydney Shoemaker, David Armstrong, perception, qualia, phenomenal character, broad perception model, Renee Smith
Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 83-87 (2011/2012). METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS BEGGED. Colin Allen.
ABSTRACT: I argue in opposition to Sam Rakover that the current lack of fully adequate theories of the subjective and qualitative aspects of mind does not justify the adoption of what he calls "methodological dualism" (Rakover, this issue). Scientific understanding of consciousness requires the continuation of attempts to explain it in terms of the neural mechanisms that support it. It would be premature to adopt a methodological stance that could foreclose on the possibility of more reductionistic approaches. The effects of such a stance would be especially pernicious insofar as methodological dualism lacks rigorous methods for testing specific models.
Tags: Behavior and Philosophy, consciousness, qualia, reductionism, naturalistic philosophy
Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 89-92 (2011/2012). COMMENTS ON "A PLEA FOR METHODOLOGICAL DUALISM AND A MULTI-EXPLANATION FRAMEWORK IN PSYCHOLOGY" BY SAM RAKOVER. Marc Branch.
ABSTRACT: Rakover argues that both mechanistic and mentalistic accounts are needed to explain behavior, and his position is based mainly on the fact that physical and mentalistic accounts have existed throughout recorded history, yet all attempts to reconcile them have failed. That is not a compelling logical rationale. The relationships between brain and behavior are only very crudely understood currently, so it is premature to believe that brain activity and so-called mental activity cannot be dealt with from a single point of view. Overlooked throughout his presentation is the existence of a selectionist account of behavior, akin to Darwin
Tags: Behavior and Philosophy, mentalism, mind
Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 93-102 (2011/2012). MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS, WILL, AND BELIEF: RAKOVER
ABSTRACT: Rakover has thought about the nature of explanation for a long time and he has written some insightful pieces on the possibility of incorporating mentalistic language into serious explanations of our activities. Here he takes an extreme tack and grounds his arguments on the oldest of all chestnuts, the mind/body problem. Ironically, as an undergraduate he may have misinterpreted the words of his favorite professor so as to lead him to agonize for decades over the proper interpretation of private experience [for him it
Tags: Behavior and Philosophy, mind/body problem, mentalism, science, folk psychology, radical behaviorism
Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 103-105 (2011/2012). THE INTENTIONAL AND THE EXTENSIONAL: A RESPONSE TO RAKOVER. Gordon Foxall
ABSTRACT: In contrast to Rakover's approach, I argue that intentional and extensional accounts of behavior are incommensurable, that the former are necessary only when the capacity of the latter to explain behavior cannot be empirically sustained, and that the intentional account takes the form of an interpretation rather than a causal description that can be reduced to functional relationships.
Tags: Behavior and Philosophy, intentional behaviorism, intentionality, extensional explanation
Behavior and Philosophy, 39/40, 107-125 (2011/2012). METHODOLOGICAL DUALISM AND MULTI-EXPLANATION FRAMEWORK: REPLIES TO CRITICISMS AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. Sam S. Rakover.
ABSTRACT: First I comment on the reasons that motivated me to develop the approach of Methodological Dualism (MD) and Multi-Explanation Framework (MEF) and present a brief summary of its main ideas; second, I respond to the commentators' criticisms; finally, I present further developments that compare my approach to other relevant psychological approaches, and develop certain arguments as to why one should employ MD and MEF.
Tags: Behavior and Philosophy, methodology, explanation, philosophy of science, mind, and psychology, Rakover

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