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From Skinner (e.g., 1938, 1974) on behavioral scientists have been interested in a unified, rigorous, scientific approach to the interplay between behavior and neurophysiology. The purpose of this section of the website is to present the work of behavioral neuroscientists who have solved problems in areas such as psychopharmacolShow More

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Behavior and Philosophy Behavioral Technology Today Other
Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 57-60, (2007).COMMENTARY ON FOXALL, INTENTIONAL BEHAVIORISM William M. Baum
Foxall's incorrect claims about behavior analysis (2007) arise from a failure to understand the stance of behavior analysis. Behavior analysis is the science of behavior; it is about behavior and not about organisms. It views behavioral events as natural events to be explained by other natural events. This view extends to verbal behavior. First-person statements and third-person statements, intentional or otherwise, are instances of behavior to be explained. Behavior analysis explains them by relating them to the history of context and consequences that might have led to their occurrence. Believing in Satan is an extended activity, of which statements about Satan constitute less extended parts; it is an error to suggest that the belief could stand as the efficient cause of its parts. That behavior repeats from time to time is no more mysterious than that other natural events repeat. Even if we do not know the physiological mechanism, filling in the temporal gaps with phony storage and representatio
Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 61-64, (2007). ARE FOXALL'S INTENTIONS GOOD? Marc N. Branch.
Foxall's argument that behavioristic and intentional approaches should be hybridized rests on his views about the inability of a behavioristic position to deal with several features of behavior, including its continuity through time. My commentary suggests that Foxall's reservations about the inadequacies of a behavioristic position are overstated. A behavioristic approach can incorporate many of the features of behavior said to embody intention. However, the radical-behavioristic approach to the continuity of behavior through time is highly unconventional, permitting provisional temporal gaps in cause-effect sequences.
Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 65-76 (2007). ABOUT ABOUTNESS: THOUGHTS ON INTENTIONAL BEHAVIORISM, Jose E. Burgos.
The rationale, scientific necessity, and character of intentionality ascriptions (assertions that attribute beliefs, expectations, wishes and such to certain systems) remain unresolved issues in the philosophy of mind and psychology. Foxall's proposed resolution (2007), which he calls "Intentional Behaviorism" (IB), is that intentionality ascriptions should be tied to the experimental analysis of behavior, nervous systems, and evolutionary considerations. Foxall's tone of scientific pluralism and attention to academic philosophy and psychology are steps in the right direction. However, I remain skeptical about IB's adequacy as a philosophical underpinning of psychology. My skepticism stems from IB's a-ontological character (which ignores the nature of intentionality, a major issue in psychology), pragmatist inclination (which invites relativism), and adoption of the linguistic view of intentionality, where intensionality is the defining criterion of intentionality.
Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 77-92 (2007). GORDON FOXALL ON INTENTIONAL BEHAVIORISM, Max Hocutt.
"Intentional behaviorism" is Gordon Foxall's name for his proposal to mix the oil of mentalist language with the water of empiricist behaviorism. The trouble is, oil and water don't mix. To remain scientific, the language of behavioral science must remain non-mental. Folk psychological ascriptions of belief and desire do not explain the patterns of behavior identified by behavior analysis; they merely describe these patterns in less scientific language. The underpinnings of these patterns, if not intentionality, must be sought in physiology, particularly neurophysiology. Intentionality is an aspect of language, not the world. If we find it in the world, it is because we have put it there.
Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 93-100 (2007). FUZZY LOGIC, Peter Killeen
Foxall introduces mental constructs into his modified behaviorism. His goals are praiseworthy, as a reconciliation of public behavior with private dialog-one that improves on contemporary extensions of behaviorism-must be achieved if our epistemology is to flourish. Despite Foxall's scholarship, however, he has not convinced me. Rather than view intentions-beliefs, attitudes, and desires-as primary causal mechanisms, I see them as elements in an internal or external dialog elicited by ourselves or others to help (ourselves or others) predict and control our behavior. Respectively, they identify discriminative stimuli, behavioral propensities, and reinforcers, which may be effective with or without our awareness of them. Sometimes the identifications are veridical. Once educed-whether by ourselves or others, whether accurate or fabulous- those characterizations can take on a life of their own as controlling stimuli, filtering and framing subsequent perceptions, providing the material for ratiocinati
Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 101-111, (2007). INTENTIONAL BEHAVIORISM AND THE INTENTIONAL SCHEME: COMMENTS ON GORDON R. FOXALL'S "INTENTIONAL BEHAVIORISM", Hugh Lacey.
This commentary discusses critically the proposal of Foxall's intentional behaviorism that, when the use of intentional categories can be justifiably portrayed as heuristic overlay to theories incorporating radical behaviorist principles, intentionality may be part of behaviorist interpretations of behavior that occurs outside of the controlled conditions of the laboratory and practical behavioral interventions. I sketch an argument that typical uses of intentional categories for the explanation of human agency (e.g., its exercise in conducting scientific research) are not properly grasped as being such heuristic overlay and so are not illuminated by behaviorist interpretations.
Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 113-130, (2007). COMMENTS ON "NTENTIONAL BEHAVIORISM" BY G. R. FOXALL, J. Moore.
Professor Foxall suggests the radical behaviorist language of contingencies is fine as far as it goes, and is quite suitable for matters of prediction and control. However, he argues that radical behaviorist language is extensional, and that it is necessary to formally incorporate the intentional idiom into the language of behavioral science to promote explanations and interpretations of behavior that are comprehensive in scope. Notwithstanding Professor Foxall's arguments, radical behaviorists hold that the circumstances identified by the use of the intentional idiom are accommodated by the radical behaviorist language of contingencies, not only for prediction and control but also for explanations and interpretations. Of central importance is that individuals may have histories that lead them to generate descriptions of past and present behavior, as well as descriptions of prevailing circumstances that have caused that behavior or are likely to cause that behavior in the future. The resulting verb
Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 131-138 (2007). A BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE OF MENTAL LIFE: COMMENTS ON FOXALL'S "INTENTIONAL BEHAVIORISM," Howard Rachlin.
According to Foxall (2007), simple acts may best be explained in terms of behavior of the organism as a whole, but complex behavioral patterns, usually described by mental terms, can only be explained by neurocognitive psychology, in which the mind is conceived as an internal mechanism. This proposed division of psychological labor is faulty, first because there is no distinct dividing line between simple (non-mental) and complex (mental) behavior, and second because behavioral psychology alone or neurocognitive psychology alone can describe both simple and complex behavioral patterns. The neurocognitive approach to the mind is based on a science of efficient causes. A post-Skinnerian behavioral approach to the mind, "teleological behaviorism," is based on a science of final causes. Teleological behaviorism studies mental life itself while neurocognitivism studies its underlying mechanism. Both are required for a complete understanding of the mind.
Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 139-148 (2007). BEHAVIORISM AND CHISHOLM'S CHALLENGE, Francois Tonneau.
Foxall's intentional behaviorism is supposed to provide explanation and understanding where radical behaviorism provides only prediction and control. Foxall does identify empirical and conceptual issues with the operant reinforcement framework, but he underestimates the extent of its flaws and partly misidentifies their nature. His intentional behaviorism suffers from conceptual difficulties, and its adherence to a form of instrumentalism may actually make it harder to understand intentional phenomena.
Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 149-183, (2007). THE THEORY DEBATE IN PSYCHOLOGY, Jose E. Burgos.
This paper is a conceptual analysis of the theory debate in psychology, as carried out by cognitivists and radical behaviorists.

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