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From Skinner (e.g., 1938, 1974) on behavioral scientists have been interested in a unified, rigorous, scientific approach to the interplay between behavior and neurophysiology. The purpose of this section of the website is to present the work of behavioral neuroscientists who have solved problems in areas such as psychopharmacolShow More

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Behavior and Philosophy, 37, 217-222 (2009). ASCRIBING INTENTIONALITY, Gordon R. Foxall.
Much of the commentary on my paper "Intentional behaviorism" (Foxall, 2007) fails to make contact with my central arguments about the use of intentional language in the explanation of behavior. Marr's (2008) remarks on my responses to that commentary (Foxall, 2008) also fail to address my original assertions. Both commentary and remarks tilt at windmills that were not in the landscape I described or hinted at in the solutions I proposed. I attempt here to map out my argument more clearly.
Behavior and Philosophy, 36, vii-viii (2008). PREFACE
Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 1-4 (2008). PETER HARZEM (1930-2008): A REVERENCE FOR LANGUAGE, Emilio Ribes-Inesta.
Peter was a wonderful human being who showed us through his intelligence, scholarship, wit, and honesty that psychology has a long way to go. All of us will miss him in this journey.
Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 5-69 (2008). DISPOSITIONING AND THE OBSCURED ROLES OF TIME IN PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS, Douglas P. Field & Philip N. Hineline.
"Now" is privileged in most psychological theories, which portray their processes as proceeding from moment-to-moment. As in any science, this adherence to contiguous causation hinders an account of phenomena that involve remote events or temporally extended organization. In addition, our scientific discourse is framed by the everyday patterns we have learned in explaining our own actions and those of others, yielding a bipolar constraint of explanatory language. Thus, tripolar relations among organism, environment and behavior are reduced to cause-effect, noun-verb, agent-action. This imposes exclusionary emphases upon organism-based or upon environment-based terms as accounting for behavior. Especially with remote causation or temporal dispersion, implicitly assumed contiguous causation appears to be defended through a practice we have called "dispositioning."
Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 71-85 (2008). DRETSKE ON THE CAUSATION OF BEHAVIOR, Constantine Sandis.
In two recent articles and an earlier book Fred Dretske appeals to a distinction between triggering and structuring causes with the aim of establishing that psychological explanations of behavior differ from non-psychological ones. He concludes that intentional human behavior is triggered by electro-chemical events but structured by representational facts. In this paper I argue that while this underrated causalist position is considerably more persuasive than the standard causalist alternative, Dretske's account fails to provide us with a coherent analysis of intentional action and its explanation.
Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 87-96 (2008). THE CONCEPT OF REINFORCEMENT: EXPLANATORY OR DESCRIPTIVE? Francois Tonneau.
The history of psychology has seen recurrent controversies on the circularity of reinforcement explanations, and behavior analysts disagree among themselves as to whether the concept of operant reinforcement is explanatory or descriptive. Some behavior theorists argue that the concept of reinforcement is merely descriptive, whereas others maintain that reinforcement explanations are acceptable provided extra precautions are taken. The issue of the circularity of reinforcement also has become embroiled in a more general problem, that of understanding what a scientific explanation is. Here I argue that the issue of demarcating scientific explanation from description takes two forms, and that once these two forms are distinguished most controversies vanish. Like the majority of scientific concepts, the concept of operant reinforcement is both descriptive and explanatory, and reinforcement explanations are never circular.
Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 97-111 (2008). THE NATURE, COMMON USAGE, AND IMPLICATIONS OF FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM, Shirley Matile Ogletree & Crystal D. Oberle.
Philosophers and psychologists have debated what is meant by free will as well as the nature of human choice. However, only recently have data been gathered to consider common usage of the term; our data support college students' belief in free will as indicating some degree of choice that is not constrained by genetic or environmental factors and as separate from a "soft" determinism perspective. How free will and determinism beliefs relate to other psychological attitudes, such as moral responsibility and tolerance, is also considered.
Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 113-155 (2008). INTENTIONAL BEHAVIORISM REVISITED, Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 113-155 (2008). INTENTIONAL BEHAVIORISM REVISITED, Gordon R. Foxall.
The central fact in the delineation of radical behaviorism is its conceptual avoidance of propositional content. This eschewal of the intentional stance sets it apart not only from cognitivism but from other neo-behaviorisms. Indeed, the defining characteristic of radical behaviorism is not that it avoids mediating processes per se but that it sets out to account for behavior without recourse to propositional attitudes. Based, rather, on the contextual stance, it provides definitions of contingency-shaped, rule-governed verbal and private behaviors which are non-intentional. However, while the account provided by radical behaviorism fulfills the pragmatic criteria of prediction and control of its subject matter, it has problems of explanation that stem from the failure of radical behaviorist interpretation to address the personal level of analysis, to provide for the continuity of behavior, and to show how its accounts can be delimited in the face of causal equifinality. This leaves gaps in its exp
Behavior and Philosophy, 36, 157-168 (2008). THE ABDICATION OF BELIEF: A COMMENT ON FOXALL'S REPLIES TO HIS CRITICS, M. Jackson Marr.
What follows is a reply to a reply and, as such, necessarily derives, at least in part, from the comments of Foxall's critics. However, I tried to review Foxall's reply as a "new" paper standing on its own merits and, as such, I wanted to respond to it as if I had not seen the earlier commentaries.
Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 1-55, (2007). INTENTIONAL BEHAVIORISM, Gordon R. Foxall.
This paper proposes an overarching philosophical framework for the analysis and interpretation of behavior that incorporates both radical behaviorism and intentional psychology in a model, "intentional behaviorism"' that additionally links the explanation of behavior to neuroscience and evolutionary psychology. Finally, the paper proposes a link between the philosophical framework of intentional behaviorism and the world of empirical science by describing a tentative model of research, "super-personal cognitive psychology'' that shows how the disparate elements previously discussed impinge upon psychological investigation.

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